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This paper will illuminate the tensions that 
exist between the government and media over what is 
national security, and what limits does true national 
security require on the press. In particular, the 
above issue will be explored in reference to the 
Pentagon Papers, a case which revolved around these 
tensions.
First of all, it is necessary to define 
"national security." The definition that will be 
used here is that national security consists of 
anything, be it tangible or intangible, that is 
required for the protection and continued safety of a 
state. Certainly items such as soldiers, tanks, and 
airplanes exist within this definition. Yet, when 
one approaches the misty area of information, a 
debate arises. This debate involves the limitations 
that a state should be allowed to place on infor­
mation in order to protect itself from both internal 
and external dangers. The main opponents that square 
off in this debate tend to be the government itself 
and the media, whose purpose is to disperse infor­
mation to the public.
The media finds itself at war with the govern­
ment on several fronts; namely in the theatres of the 
newsman's shield, the duty to report the truth to the 
public rather than disinformation, and the right to
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print classified information. All three of these 
theatres of conflict involve the 1st Amendment and 
its protection of the rights of a free press. 
"Freedom to publish, not freedom to censor, is 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Freedom of the 
press exists, as Justice Louis Brandeis put it more 
than forty years ago, to aid in the 'discovery and 
spread of political truth'. Freedom of the press 
is guaranteed in order that the people may have suf­
ficient information to participate intelligently as 
self-governing members in a democratic order fNotes 
43,44]."
The conflict over the newsman's shield involves 
the question of the ability of reporters to protect 
their human sources of information from governmental 
inquiries and possible prosecution. The media argues 
vociferously that the ability to protect its sources 
from subpoena is equal to the totality of its ability 
to monitor the government, a role which is denied not 
even by governmental officials. "Much of the media 
insists that newsmen should not be required by courts 
or other governmental inquisitors to identify sources 
of confidential information or to surrender either 
their notes or information given them in confidence. 
Television newsmen, largely supported by the rest of 
the media, assert that their unedited or unbroadcast
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tapes should also be immune to subpoena (Notes 12, 
13)t" On the other side of this issue is the govern­
ment - which doesn't deny the role of the media in 
monitoring governmental affairs, however, it does 
assert its right to issue subpoenas so that it may 
have access to the newsman's source of information.
These two warring factions meet on yet another 
battlefield, namely that of disinformation vs. the 
truth. This question involves the public's "right to 
know” which is implicit in the right of free press. 
However, on the other side, government often needs to 
disinform its enemies in order to survive in this 
politically complex world, and the media is an 
excellent means by which to do so. This is par­
ticularly case when the enemies assume that the
media will report only the truth. Clearly, this is 
another important manifesttation of the ever present 
tension between government and the media, which is 
the focus of this paper.
A third theatre of confrontation involves the abi­
lity of the media to print classified information, ver­
sus the abilty of the government to protect poten­
tially damaging state secrets. Even the definition of 
"classified information" is in dispute, for the media 
often claims that the government overclassifies 
material that is neither secret nor potentially 
dangerous. The government vigorously disagrees,
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stating simply that some overclassification is 
necessary in situations which are all too ambiguous, 
which happens frequently in the world of politics.
On these three fronts the battle of information is 
fought. It is a battle which is as old as newspapers, 
and has serious implications for both the nature of 
government and the role of the media. One court case 
in particular embodies not only the media/government 
tension, but also illustrates how these theoretical 
tensions can become tangible in a menacing form. This 
case is the 1971 case of The New York Times Company vs. 
The United States Pentagon Papers, which was argued on 
June 26, 1971 and decided on June 30, 1971.
In order to understand fully the nature of this 
case, and its constitutional and nonconstitutional 
manifestations, as well as other issues, the rest of 
this paper will be divided up as follows:
1. The facts of the Pentagon Papers will be 
explained.
2. An analysis of the court decision in this 
case will be made.
3. The larger but related issue of constitu­
tional freedoms vs. personal and state 
security will be examined.
4 . Conclusions will be reached with regard 
to the above.
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Before the facts of the Pentagon Papers can be 
explained, a brief history of some of the issues and 
conflicts in the Vietnam War needs to be made. The 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam can be characterized as a 
series of escalations starting with Roosevelt after 
WWII, and ending with Mixon in 1973. These escalations 
flowed together in an uneven but continuous effort to 
prevent communism from dominating IndoChina. Moreover, 
all of the U.S. policies had as their fundamental basis 
the basic perception that the U.S. had vital interest 
in being in IndoChina, and particularly in Vietnam. 
Also, policy was based on the desire to prevent com­
munism from taking over these same territories. This 
commitment remained the same from Roosevelt to Nixon. 
"The objective |of the U.s.J of preventing defeat to 
which these stakes gave birth was the same in 1950 as 
in 1954, 1961, and 1964, and the language used to 
justify this objective remained strikingly similar 
throughout. All of which leads to this conclusion: 
Vietnam was not a story of involvements driving commit­
ments but of involvement coming into line with commit­
ment as the need arose tp.244 of The Irony of Vietnam: 
Tne System Worked)."
Over time the U.S. found itself in a bloody stale­
mate that it couldn't win, but also couldn't afford to 
lose. It couldn't win because winning required an
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invasion of North Vietnam, an action that the U.S. 
feared would pull in the Chinese - as had happened 
during the Korean War, It couldn’t lose because U.S. 
credibility was on the line, and because Indochina was 
a strategic area in the bipolar struggle with com­
munism, and also due to the desire to keep IndoChina 
itself free. The result of this dilemma was limited 
U.S. involvement, and the passing of this "hot potatoe" 
from one leader to the next. "With hindsight, it 
seems evident that the costs of the strategy of pre­
venting defeat were incalcuable. But at the time of 
the crucial decisions the cost of accepting defeat 
appeared to be incalcuable Cp.4 of The Irony of 
Vietnam: The System Worked]."
The major escalations of the war happened under 
Kennedy and Johnson, who both felt that they were doing 
what was necessary in view of the above constraints. 
Kennedy had positioned 16,000 troops in place by the 
time that he was shot, while Johnson brought combat 
forces up to h of a million men after the escalation of 
1965. This escalation continued until the 1968 Tet 
Offensive, which was a communist offensive that failed 
militarily, but succeeded in putting the war on the 
television sets of America - thus leading to a change 
of heart in the American public. This change of heart 
called for an end to this long and frustrating
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confrontation, which did not come about until the 1973 
Paris Peace Accords, that didn't end the war, but ended 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Later in 1975, the North 
Vietnamese formally attacked South Vietnam with conven­
tional troops, and established their rule over what was 
once South Vietnam.
The Facts of the Pentagon Papers
What is important for our purposes here is a study 
that was started by Robert McNamara back on June 17, 
1967 . McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defense, 
wanted to achieve an objective study of the U.S, 
involvement in Vietnam. He set up a team of pro­
fessionals, and had them complete a report called the 
Defend Department History of United States 
Dec isionmaking on Vietnam, which became known to the 
public in June of 1971 as the Pentagon Papers. "On 
June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert S. McNamara directed 
that a task force be formed to study the history of 
United States involvement in Vietnam fron World War ri 
to the present. Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply to 
do studies that were 'encyclopedic and objective*. 
With six full-time professionals assigned to the task 
force, we were to complete our work in three months. A 
year and a half later, and with the involvement of ix 
times six professionals, we are finally done to the
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tune of 37 studies and 15 collections of documents in 
43 volumes [p,I5 of the Gravel Edition of the Pentagon 
Papers, Volume 1] ."
The Pentagon Papers upon completion was labeled 
"top secret," which restricted the number of governmen­
tal officials wno could have access to it, and excluded 
the public entirely. This restriction was later lifted 
over 95% of the material in the report, however, to 
this date that 5% is still classified as "top secret" 
and has not been published, "The essential source of 
information about U.S. decisions on Vietnam is the 
official Defense Department history, popularly known 
as the Pentagon Papers, compiled by a task force in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the late 
I9601 s, These papers have been published in three 
for s, but none is complete and none fully subsumes 
any of the others |Notes 17,18)."
The Pentagon Papers became public in the midst of 
controversy; for they were published first by the New 
York Times who had been given the papers by Dr. Daniel 
Ellsberg - one of the authors of the Pentagon Papers, 
who desired an end to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 
On funday, June 13, 1971 the Times printed its first 
article that explained the U.S. role in provoking the 
Tonkin Gulf incident, a minor event that led to the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution in congress, which authorized
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Johnson to escalate the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 
The section that the Times printed shocked not only the 
nation, but congressional leaders as well - who were 
angry at the executive branch for covering up the U.S. 
role in provoking the incident. The executive branch 
was furious that someone had leaked the papers to the 
press. Moreover, the executive branch was angry at the 
press for printing the material despite the fact that 
it was clearly labeled top secret. The administration 
felt that "publication of the contents of the study. . 
. will constitute a violation of Section 793 (e).
Moreover, such publication will result in irrepairable 
injury to the interest of the United States, for which 
there is no adequate remedy at law Ip. 77 of The 
Pentagon Papers and the Courts].” In order to prevent 
"further harm," the government sent the Times a 
telegram after they published another segment of the 
papers on Monday, June 14, 1971. "The telegram
threatened court action to halt the publication if the 
Times did not comply voluntarily and claimed that con­
tinued publication of the classified documents was pro­
hibited by the provisions of the Espionage Law tp.2 of 
The Pentagon Papers and the Courts].” The Times 
refused to abide by the telegram, thus adding to the 
growing conflict with the government.
The third segment was printed on Tuesday,
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June 15, 1971, which led the administration to request 
a temporary injunction against further publication, 
which was granted by District Court Judge Murray 
Gurfein. Also, the administration put the FBI on the 
case, in order to discover the source of the Times 
information.
Meanwhile, the Washington Post began to publish 
parts of the Pentagon Papers on Friday, June 18, 1971. 
Again the administration requested and was given a tem­
porary injunction to prevent publication of the 
classified material, but this was to prove inadequate 
in the face of things to come.
For, the Boston Globe began to publish segments of 
the Pentagon Papers on June 22, 1971. For the third 
time the administration requested and was granted a tem­
porary injuction against the paper, but all eyes turned 
quickly back to the New York Times, for Judge Gurfein 
had decided against a permanent injunction, and the 
case had risen to the United States Court of Appeals 
due to an appeal from the administration.
On Wednesday, June 23, the court declared that the 
Times could publish only information that the govern­
ment approved of, however, the court also restricted 
the government by declaring that it must allow the 
Times to publish all material that wouldn't harm 
national security. This ambiguous and somewhat
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contradictory decision led both sides to declare that 
they would appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. 
"The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruled 
that the New York Times could resume publication only 
of materials deemed by the Government not to be 
dangerous to national security. It also ordered 
Judge Gurfein to hold hearings to determine which 
portions of the report were so sensitive that their 
publication should be enjoined and which materials 
could safely be permitted publication tp.7 of 
T.P.P.A.T.C.J."
On Wednesday, June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court 
decided in favor of the New York Times in a 6 to 3 
decision, and gave the paper the authority to publish 
what it wanted.
The Times continued to publish articles based on 
the papers until July 5, 1971, when they completed the 
series with the ninth and last article.
This then is the departure point from the facts 
section of this paper, and it is the point at which an 
analysis of the Pentagon Papers court case will be 
embarked upon. By analyzing this case, the intangible 
theoretical conflict between the government and the 
media will be made tangible, and the concrete aspects 
of this case will shed further light on the tensions 
that exist between these two institutions.
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Prior to examining the actual contents of this 
complex decision, it is of great necessity that an 
understanding of previous opinions, laws and precedents 
must be reached.
Way back in 1799 Jefferson and Madison wrote that 
a certain amount of abuse from the press is acceptable 
(from the viewpoint of the government and governmental 
leaders), for it often goes hand-in-hand with proper 
and responsible reporting from the press. Stemming 
from this premise then, is the notion (and conclusion) 
that in order to prevent the abuse, one would have to 
impair some of the proper use - a result that is 
clearly unacceptable and incorrect. "The Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, in which James Madison 
joined Jefferson as co-author, said: "Some degree of
abuse is inseparable from the . . . use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than in the prac­
tice of the press. It has accordingly been decided by 
the practice of the States, that it is better to leave 
a few of the noxious branches, to their luxuriant 
growth, than by pruning them away, to injure the vigor 
of those yielding the proper fruits |Notes 10,11J."
Several laws have been passed over the course of
U.S. history that are relevant to the decision
reached, and quite obviously were passed prior to the
introduction of the case at hand to the court system.
Of these laws several are extremely prominent, namely
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the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the Espionage 
Act of 1917. Both sets of laws were authorized during 
wartime, and both restricted the ability of individuals 
and the press to communicate their ideas effectively to 
the public at large. "Congress has also enacted 
several laws. . . the first of which were the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798. At that time, war with France 
appeared eminent, and the need was felt to oust 
•dangerous* aliens and to impeach those individuals who 
might write or speak *with intent to defame* the 
government, the Congress, or the President. The Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798 delineate the first legisla­
tion which seriously threatened freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press in the United States. The 
Espionage Act of 1917 was the antecedent of widespread 
enforcement for the first time of censorship by the 
United States government. . .[Notes 49,50, 51J •" 
One further law that has great impact upon this 
case is Executive Order 10501, which describes in 
detail what shall and shall not be classified material, 
who shall have access to classified documents, and what 
the classification system shall be. For our purposes 
here it needs only to be mentioned that Executive Order 
10501 does include the Pentagon Papers within its 
rather large scope, and since these papers were labeled 
"Top Secret" and were restricted to authorized person­
nel, the publishing of these documents clearly violated 
both the spirit and letter of the law. Section 8
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(paragraph A) states that "transmission of Top Secret 
material shall be effected preferably hy direct contact 
of officials concerned . . ." Clearly, the means hy 
which the newspapers acquired the documents did net 
involve the "officials concerned," therefore the law 
was violated. Supporting this conclusion, is the 
interesting fact that the defendents (the newspapers) 
did not dispute that they in fact had violated the law.
There is a loophole in the Espionage Act that 
allows the Pentagon Papers to slip through - without 
violating either the spirit or letter of this par­
ticular law. While it does restrict what can be 
printed slightly, it is not a "blanket" restriction, 
and thus does not effectively restrict information at 
all. In point oi fact, when the law was first brought 
to the Congress it contained a passage that would have 
completely restricted newspapers in wartime, however 
this key passage was deleted. "Congress deleted a pro­
posed provision that would have authorized the 
President in wartime to 'prohibit the publishing or 
communicating of or the attempting to publish or com­
municate, any information relating to the national 
defense which, in his judgment, is of such character 
that it is or might be useful to the enemy.' That pro­
vision was denounced at the time as a form of 
'precensor shir,' Again, in 1953 , and 1957, Congress
specifically considered extending the Espionage Act to
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cover newspapers but rejected that course as constitu­
tionally unacceptable {Notes 27,28,29J."
Precedents must also be examined prior to an ana­
lysis of The New York Times Company vs. The United 
States case. At the neart of these precedents and the 
Pentagon Papers case is the notion of tolerance, in 
this case what is an acceptable and constitutional 
level of governmental interference with the press. The 
case is not as simple as asking if a law had been 
violated - for it had been violated (Executive Order 
10501), rather as Ronald Dworkin stated it is a matter 
of moral correctness, not simply legal correctness. 
"But the argument that, because the government believes 
a man has committed a crime, it must prosecute him ; <5 
weaker than it seems. Society 'cannot endure' if it 
tolerates all disobedience; it does not follow, 
however, nor is there evidence, that it will collapse 
if it tolerates some {Dworkin, p.206J." Since this 
case is more complex than what is the current letter of 
the law, we must do what the judge, lawyers and other 
responsible parties did in this case, namely - examine 
the precedents.
Two main precedents stand firmly on the side of 
the government, these are the United States vs. 
Curtiss-Wright Expcrt-Corp. and Chicago and Southern 
Air Lines Inc. vs. Waterman Corporation. In the 
United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. the court
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affirmed the right of the chief executive to keep 
information classified and secret - in order to protect 
national security. The Court stated that ’his Itbe 
PresidentJ confidential sources of information . . . 
Secrecy is respect of information gathered by them may 
be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it 
productive of harmiul results."
Again in Chicago and Southern Air Lines Inc. vs. 
Waterman Corporation, the court reaffirmed the right of 
the President to keep certain documents from unauthor­
ized eyes. "The President, both as Commander-in-Chief 
and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs has 
available intelligence services whose reports are net 
and ought not to be published . . . "
Yet, on the side of the New York Times (and 
newspapers everywhere) a:e two other cases that contra­
dict the two pro-government cases and balance the scale 
of precedents.
The first case is Near vs. Minnesota, a case in 
which the Court defended the right of the press to 
investigate the government - in order to look for abuse 
of governmental powers. The Court wrote that the fact 
that "the liberty of the press may be abused by 
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the 
less necessary the immunity of the press from previous 
restraint in dealing with official misconduct."
In the second case, The Organization For a Better
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Austin vs, Keefe, the court set forth the "heavy 
presumption" rule, which places the burden of proof on 
the broad shoulders of the government, not the press. 
The Court wrote "any prior restraint on expression 
comes to this Court with a ’heavy presumption’ against 
its constitutional validity."
In evaluating the precedents then, it appears that 
a rather ambiguous situation exists. It seems that 
there is no clear pattern or path that could shed illu­
minating light upon this case, rather the situation is 
in doubt. However, the "heavy presumption" rule is 
helpful, and it is clear that it will play a large role 
in the resolution of this case. In any case, it is now 
time to turn to a direct analysis of the Pentagon 
Papers case itself, including the decision and logic of 
the Court that ruled over the case. It is here that 
many of the above questions shall he linked together 
and answered, while new questions shall be raised.
First and foremost, it must be noted that this 
landmark case was argued on June 26 , 1971 and decided 
on June 30 , 1971 - in the midst of great controversy 
and political upheaval. With hut five days to examine 
the facts, research properly, and argue out the case, 
one wonders how a correct decision could hav j been 
reached. Moreover, when one considers that our legal 
system usually proceeds at a slow pace and with great 
deliberation (despite the right to a speedy trial),
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one must question the extreme speed at which this case 
was rushed through the system. Furthermore, since the 
material was composed in 1967, and since it wasn't 
urgent for the press to print its articles (although at 
the time urgency was no doubt felt), the question must 
be asked with more emphasis - simply put, why did the 
Court allow itself to be rushed? One would speculate 
that the Court found itself under intense pressure 
(although what kind of pressure this might have been - 
one doesn't know), and this pressure could have forced 
a hurried decision. By rushing, the Come no doubt 
deprived history of numerous related arguments that 
perhaps should have been made, but were not, due to the 
lack of time. However, one can only examine what has 
been said and done, for conjecture is just that - con­
jecture, so now we must turn to the actual decision 
itself.
The Court decided in favor of the Hew York Times, 
declaring that the government had failed to meet the 
"heavy burden" of proof. The Court declared that any 
"system of prior restraints of expression comes to this 
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu­
tional validity. . . The Government thus carries a 
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposi­
tion of such a restraint. . . The District Court for 
the Southern District of New York in the New York Times 
case, and the District Court for the District of
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Colombia and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Colombia Circuit. . . held that the Government had not 
met that burden. We agree."
In support of this decision# Justice Stewart cited 
the growth of the Executive in the nuclear age, which 
has given the Executive powers that neither the judi­
cial nor congressional branches can check. He then 
proceeded to state that an informed public is the hest 
possible check of this power. This argument is a com­
mon one# yet it is intelligent and logical# and most 
importantly - it is supported by history. "This power 
[Executive] largely unchecked by the Legislative and 
Judicial branches# has been pressed to the very hilt 
since the advent of the nuclear missile age. . . the 
only effective restraint upon executive policy and 
power in th^ areas of national defense and inter­
national affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry. • 
. it is perhaps here that a press that is alert# aware# 
and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the 
First Amendment."
Justice White# who is in full agreement with 
Justice Stewart# attacked this case from a related but 
distinctively different viewpoint. White deals with 
more than just the case that is here at-hand# rather he 
preadventures what the future holds if this case were 
decided in favor of the government. For White the 
answer is clear enough# for the path could lead to
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regular government censorship, and legal and moral 
acceptance of such blatantly unconstitutional behavior. 
Clear to him, is the sound idea (and premise) that it 
is better and safer to side with the media, for the 
future would hold fewer opportunities for excessive 
abuse. "To sustain the Government in these cases would 
start the courts down a long and hazardous road that I 
am not willing to travel, at least without 
congressional guidance and direction." The fact that 
White included the phrase "at least without 
congressional guidance and direction," infers a very 
powerful message. Simply put* White would consider 
siding with the government in a like case sometime in 
the future, if and only if, the congress would address 
the issue in a substantial way. Also evident in this 
phrase, is the call for congress to not only address 
this problem, but to set detailed limits on the 
authority of the government. All of which includes the 
implicit notion of a boundary, a line which could be 
drawn in the struggle between media and government that 
would be instrumental in future battles, and perhaps 
by its very presence, reduce the tensions that exist 
between these two very powerful and diverse institu­
tions. More shall be said about this later.
Justice Marshall, who agrees with Stewart and 
White, sees this case as an example, or model case, 
that can resolve the question: should the court or
-20-
congress make law? "Witn all due respect, I believe 
the ultimate issue in this Ccise is even more basic. . . 
The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has the 
power to make law." For Marshall, the answer to his 
question is the congress, for he feels that it is the 
primary lawmaking body in the land, and as such it 
should not have its power usurped by the judicial 
system. Since the congress had previously declined to 
allow censorship by the government of the press (only 
during debate) he *eels that a decision that would 
favor the government in this case - would in fact 
amount to the judicial system making laws against the 
will of the congress. "It would, however, be utterly 
inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers 
for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent 
behavior that Congress has specifically declined to 
prohibit.” While I see the logic in this argument, I 
can also see that it is faulty in reasoning, and 
moreover is somewhat off-track. First of all, while 
the congress did in fact decline to include government 
censorship in its laws, it did not specifically exclude 
it either. It left the issue unresolved and
unanswered, which is where a court decision could 
legally come in and resolve the dispute. In fact, that 
is a primary function of the Courts, something that 
Marshall fails to note. He rejects the possibility of 
deciding in favor of the government, because he feels
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that this would amount to the Court making law over 
the will of the congress. Yet, the history of the U.S. 
common law legal system goes against this, for the 
judicial system often makes law - even over the objec­
tion of legislatures, although this was not the case in 
this instance for no explicit law exists that illustra­
tes the will of the congress on this matter. One has
only to examine the cases of Roe vs. Wade, or Brown vs.
The Board of Education to realize that the judicial 
system often is the leader of change, not simply a 
passive body as Justice Marshall paints it to be. To 
his credit, Justice Marshall does include similar 
remarks to Stewart and White - in a logical and
coherent format. He stresses the importance of preser­
ving the 1st Amendment's powers, and intelligently 
decides that the future would be best protected by
limiting the ability of the government to practice 
censorship.
On the other side of the coin, are excellent and 
reasonable arguments that are heard in dissent of the 
majority decision. Among these voices is Justice 
Burger who expresses his anger and frustration at being 
forced to come to a decision in so short a time, while 
under such great pressure. I couldn't agree more, for 
as I forementioned, five days for such a major and 
monumental decision is shocking to me as well. Justice
Burger declared "the consequence of all this melancholy
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series of events is that we literally do not know what 
we are acting on. As I see it, we have been forced to 
deal with litigation concerning rights of great magni­
tude without an adequate record, and surely without 
time for adequate treatment either in the prior pro­
ceedings or in this Court. Tt is interesting to note 
that counsel, on both sides, in oral argument before 
this Court, were frequently unable to respond to 
questions on factual points. Not surprisingly they 
pointed out that they had been working literally 
'around the clock' and simply were unable to review the 
documents that give rise to these cases and were not 
familiar with them. This Court is in no better 
posture." Justice Burger also points out his horror at 
the fact that the newspaper printed stolen material 
even though it realized it was stolen. To Burger, the 
case is merely one of stolen property (even the paper 
didn't dispute that they knew the material was stolen), 
and as such the paper should be punished and prohibited 
from publishing further material, regardless of whether 
the material could be damaging or not. "To me it is 
hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a 
great institution in American life would fail to per­
form one of the basic and simple duties of every citi­
zen with respect to the discovery or possession of sto­
len property or secret government documents." This 
argument is valid, relevant, and almost impossible
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to shoot holes in except on one point, namely that it 
is the government that is labeling the material as 
classified in the first place - thus making the 
material stolen and unprintable. Since the government 
is a party in this case, and part of what is at issue 
is what can be published or not, the resolution of this 
issue should not be decided by a rule that is soley 
authored by one side of the dispute - without ' ^ut hv 
the other side. In other words, the fact that the 
material is stolen is not as important as the question 
of can it be printed. The answer to the latter 
question will determine and resolve the first question, 
but the reverse is not true, for to answer the first 
will not answer the second - which is the issue at - 
hand. In short then, Burger addresses a part but 
ignores the whole.
Justice Harlan dissents as well, on the grounds 
that the Executive branch needs secrecy to function 
optimally. lie feels that since this is a case of 
foreign policy, a function of the executive, neither 
the courts nor congress should interfere, and the press 
should stay "out" too. Harlan cites Chicago and 
Southern Air Lines Inc. vs. Waterman Corp. , for he 
feels that its relevance cannot be understated. "The 
very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy 
is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly
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confided by our Constitution to the political depart­
ments of the government, Executive and Legislative. 
They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements 
of prophecy. They are and should he undertaken only by 
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare 
they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind 
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facili­
ties nor responsibility and have long been held to 
belong in the domain of political power not subject to 
judicial intrusion or inquiry." Harlan's logic is 
good, and his argument is unshakable, it therefore will 
be left to stand intact and unhindered.
Blackmun also dissented, pointing as well to the 
provision of the constitution which provides the 
Executive with the authority to conduct foreign 
affairs. He stresses the need for moderation and 
tolerance of all concerned parties, and warns against 
"absolutism" of the 1st Amendment. "The First 
Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire 
Constitution. Article II of the great document rests 
in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct 
of foreign affairs and places in that branch the 
responsiblity for the Nation's safety. Each provision 
of the Constitution is important, and I cannot 
subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for 
the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other 
provisions." Blackmun's argument is very substantial,
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for it logically upports his dissenting decision in a 
coherent and consistent manner.
All in all, the 6-3 decision that supported the 
press shows areas of illuminating thought, while it has 
other sections thst are short-sighted and poorly 
supported.
On the positive side of the scale are those justi­
ces who looked in detail towards the future results of 
their decision. They not only examined the future, hut 
took responsibility for it, which is highly commendable 
and noble. It is interesting to note that those 
authors who did so were in the majority - which gives 
one the feeling that the correct decision was reached, 
although this will be touched upon later.
On the negative side was the fact that the deci­
sion was hurried and possibly pressured. Four of the 
nine justices made long and explicit references to this 
problem, and declared their discomfort at having to 
rush. One gets the feeling that they all had more to
say, but lacked the time to properly express their
viewpoints . Also on the negative side of the balance
sheet was the faulty logic of Justice Marshal 1, who
based his argument on pillars that wer e too wea^ to
support it. However, his decision had many good points 
that stand to show that he wasn’t too far off track.
Personally, I agree with the decision reached. I 
feel that it is safer to favor the press, than the
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government, for the abuse that may be suffered in the 
future is less great. Standing with 20/20 hindsight to 
my favor, one has only to look at the current scandal 
with Iran in order to realize that some abuse of power 
has happened on the side of the press. However, one 
must not forget other related lessons of history - like 
Watergate, for the tale that it weaves is one of 
governmental abuse. Still, I feel that the crises that* 
evolve from press abuse are less dangerous in form and 
function, leading me back to where T originated - 
namely that the decision was correct; for it favored the 
press.
It is important that we examine the larger but 
related issue of constitutional freedoms vs. personal 
and state security, for it is here that many loose ends 
will be tied up, and many remaining questions will be
answered. This forthcoming section, the 3rd section of 
this paper, will show how this specific case is reflec­
tive of the overall tensions between the media and
government.
This paper is structured to examine the tensions 
that exist between the media and the government. The 
Pentagon Papers case is merely a vehicle for examining 
this complex issue, and it is unquestionably illumi­
nating in this function. Two closely related topics 
will be explored in this third section, and they as
well shall serve as vehicles in examining the tensions 
that exist between these two institutions.
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1) Topic Is An examination of the historical 
conflict between the needs of national security 
and the requirements of a free press shall be 
undertaken.
2) Topic 2: An examination of the historical
conflict between key leaders and the press 
shall be undertaken.
These two above topics, when added to the previous ana­
lysis of The Pentagon Papers, will provide the pillars 
upon which the foundation of a greater understanding 
about the media and government shall rest upon. The 
close relationship between these three pillars is self- 
evident, for they all contain key parts of the whole 
tension between the media and government.
Topic 1: In approaching an examination of the
historical conflict between the needs of national 
security and the press, it is important to set certain 
parameters which narrow the topic so as to allow for in 
depth analysis. First of all, this text will only 
include the executive branch in its scope. Secondly, 
this section will focus only on a few major confron­
tations that have taken place during the 20th century 
while excluding the numerous skirmishes that have 
dotted recent history. Third and finally, this exami­
nation will avoid regional and local conflicts} while 
spotlighting encounters of national dimensions. With 
these parameters set, it is now possible to dissect the 
specifics of the relevant events.
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Since The Pentagon Papers case happened during the 
course of the Vietnam War# the conflicts examined here 
shall also deal with wars. In particular the wars 
spotlighted are the War to End All Wars (WWX) , World 
War II, and the Korean War.
During WWI, the war between the government and the 
media was greatly enlarged. The question of what mili­
tary information could be printed became even more cru­
cial than ever before, for the lives of U.S. servicemen 
depended upon maintaining secrecy during key movements 
and battles. The government established the CPI 
(Committee on Public Information), which could censor 
military news at will. Legislative support for this 
measure was enacted under the Espionage Act, which was 
signed into law in 1917. These steps enraged the 
press, which vocalized its strong objections, but 
obeyed the rules of the game - and submitted completely 
to the censorship. "With only a few minor exceptions, 
newspapers complied with wartime censorship, and still 
the President did not trust them. He wanted statutory 
censorship, too, and he got it in the Espionage Act, 
passed in June 1917, which at any other time would not 
have withstood a First Amendment test. A cry of 
outrage went up from the press [The Press and The 
Presidency p.384J." The government clearly won this 
encounter with the press, for during the course of the
war it humbled, dominated, and brought the press to its
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collective knees. It demanded acceptance of its cen­
sorship on the grounds of national security, and it was 
upon these same grounds that freedom of the press was 
sacr ii iced.
When WWII erupted on the American scene, it 
created a deep fissure that further separated the 
government from the press. Roosevelt, who had a smooth 
touch with public relations, used his "fireside 
chats" to not only warm the hearts of depression-weary 
citizens, but also to convince them of the correctness 
of his actions. Moreover, he too set up a wartime cen­
soring board that completely restricted unauthorized 
reports of the war. "The outbreak of war only provoked 
new tensions. While the troublesome problem of wartime 
censorship was handled with a smoothness never seen 
before, under the direction of Byron Price, an able and 
trusted Associated Press executive, the correspondents 
who covered the President found themselves subjected to 
what they considered unreasonable restrictions as 
Roosevelt tried to keep his movements as secret as 
possible. He seemed to treat the correspondents with a 
kind of amused contempt . . . fT.P.A.T.P. p. 449J." 
Again, the government won another battle with the 
press, subjugating it to Executive authority and cur­
tailing its freedoms.
Not only were newspapers and radio restricted, but
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the actual movements of reporters as well. Often they 
couldn't travel to certain areas of conflict due to a 
lack of military transportation - or so the government 
insisted. Yet, upon arriving by other means, they 
regularly were met with ultimatums and barbed wire. 
"The correspondents fared no better at the President's 
overseas conferences. Barbed wire held them back at 
Cairo, and, when this meeting was transferred to 
Teheran, they were prevented from leaving Cairo by 
military order JT.P.A.T.P. p.450J."
The Korean War wasn't as restricting on the press 
as the two previous wars. Perhaps this was due to the 
limited scope of the war, or maybe due to the lack of a 
formal declaration of war. An added factor, of no 
small importance, is that advances in technology (like 
television) made the transmission of information 
quicker ti.an ever before, thus restricting the ability 
of the government to "choke"- off unwanted pieces of 
information. This new technology that was born during 
this time tipped this battle between the media and the 
government in the favor of the press. While the 
government still controlled access into military areas, 
it had a more difficult time stopping the instant flow 
of information out of these areas. This is not to say 
that the media wasn't restricted - for it was, rather 
it is to say that its restrictions were far less severe 
than during the two previous wars.
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In sum then, the government dominated the press 
during WWI and WWII completely, while the Korean 
Conflict provided the media with a brief respite - 
although restrictions still existed. When one compares 
the climate that existed for the press during the 
publication of The Pentagon Papers (The Vietnam War was 
raging), one finds a further relaxation of the wartime 
binds that were imposed upon the media. This leads one 
to notice a clear-cut pattern that has developed during 
the 20th Century, namely, during wartime government 
restrictions on the media have progressively relaxed. 
The cause of this relaxation may be due to better modes 
of communication, or to the lesser nature of more 
recent conflicts. One can speculate that it is a mix­
ture of both causes that has created this pattern - 
although t lis is merely conjecture.
It is now time to examine the second topic, which 
addresses the conflict that has historically taken 
place between key governmental leaders and the press. 
This analysis will shed further light on the more 
general subject of the tension that exists between the 
media and government.
Two Presidents, that were both involved with 
serious confrontations during their tenures, are best 
chosen to demonstrate how the p ess and the President 
(in office) interact and influence each other.
Lincoln, who faced the challenge of reuniting a country
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bent on division, and Nixon who swirled about in the 
Watergate Affair before being drowned in its wake, are 
the two men who are chosen for this analysis.
The following Lincoln example was chosen for three 
reasons. First of all, like all previous examples, 
this major event involved, in fact was, a war. 
Secondly, it showed a remarkable level of support for a 
President’s decision regarding the conduct of a war, 
with the press of all inst itutions supporting Lincoln 
to the hilt. Third and finally, this support for Lincoln 
starkly contrasts with the actions of the press during 
the Watergate Affair.
For Lincoln, who was fluctuating on whether or not 
to forcibly reunite the shattered Union, the Northern 
press had great influence on him. The press appeared 
to be egging Lincoln into a confrontation with the 
South, and devoted many articles to encourage Lincoln 
in this pursuit. Shortly after Lincoln made the deci­
sion to fight, the press clearly affirmed his position
that a "short war" was all that was needed for
reunification. "The press of the North agreed with
Lincoln's belief in a short war and proclaimed it in 
extravagant terms. 'The nations of Europe,' wrote the 
New York Tribune inelegantly, 'may rest assured that 
Jeff. Davis and Co. will be swinging from the battle­
ments at Washington . . .  by the 4th of July. We spit
upon a later and longer deferred justice' §p.ll4 of Why
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the Civil WarJ." The strong support of the Northern 
press for the war was a further encouragement to 
Lincoln to stay on his chosen path of defeating the 
South and reuniting the country, "The Chicago Tribune
was equally confident. 'Let the East get out of the
way ,' it challenged. ' . • * We can fight the battle,
and succeis^fully, within two or three months at the
fur thest. Illinois can whip the South by herse!If. '
IP- 114 of Why the Civil War]."
The antagonism of the press towards Nixon during 
the Wat ?rgate Affair, serves as a valid contrast to the 
support that Lincoln was given by the press during the 
course of the Civil War. This antagonism was fueled 
largely by Nixon's own resentment of the press, which 
he bluntly proclaimed over and over on television, 
radio and in the newspapers. Nixon raged "I have never 
heard or seen such outrageous, vicious, distorted 
reporting in twenty-seven years of public life. I am 
not blaming anybody for that. Perhaps what happened is 
that what we did brought it about, and therefore, the 
media decided that they would have to take that par­
ticular line. But when people are pounded night after 
night with that kiM of frantic, hysterical reporting, 
it naturally shakes their confidence |p.200 of 
Presidents and the Press!."
Nixon took out his frustration at the press in 
various ways, but most of all, he restricted their
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access to him. He reduced the number and length of his 
press conferences, and left the press with little more 
than conjecture about how he viewed Watergate. "During 
the Watergate months President Nixon held steadfastly 
to his conviction that the formal press conference was 
an institution of little merit. Facing reporters ir. 
such a situation was too dangerous. . . Between March 
1973 and August 1974 , therefore, Nixon held only six 
regular press conferences Jp.197 of Presidents and the 
PressJ."
This mutual antagonism between the press and Nixon 
injured both parties, for the conflict left the press 
short of needed information, while Nixon's image 
decayed rapidly. When added to the confrontations with 
the press over Vietnam and The Pentagon Papers, it is 
clear that the press and Nixon had no shortage of ammu­
nition to hurl at each other.
All in all, it is evident that the conflict bet­
ween the press and government over "national security" 
vs. the requirements of a free press (topic one of this 
section), and the confrontation between key leaders and 
the press (topic two of this section) are closely 
intertwined. These almost "natural" conflicts are 
largely a product of the roles that the government and 
the press play, for these roles pit one against the 
other - almost as if they were designed to be a part of 
the system of checks and balances. Thus, these roles 
flung the members of these institutions at each other
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during WWI, WWII, the Korean War, Watergate, Vietnam, 
and throughout the Pentagon Papers Affair. The only 
exception to this rule was the remarkably supporting 
role that the press played during the Civil War in sup­
port of Lincoln. However, this "support" can be 
explained by a closer analysis of the situation that 
existed at the time.
When the country fractured in two, so did the 
press of the nation, with those disloyal to the Union 
(and Lincoln) strongly supporting the South - by virtue 
of their de facto location in the South. Therefore, 
the support that Lincoln was given by the press can he 
explained simply by its location in the North. 
Certainly, when one examines the press of the nation as 
a whole - including both North and South, one finds 
that the action, taken by Lincoln were much more 
controversial. This leaves the above rule intact and 
without qualifications. Restated, this rule is that 
the roles that are played by both media and government 
are naturally antagonistic, therefore the creation of 
tensions come as no surprise, but merely reflect the 
stances and positions of these two institutions.
This then, is an excellent point at which to begin 
section four of this project. Here further lax strands 
will be linked together, while firm conclusions will 
tie the previous three sections together into a cohe­
sive whole.
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In this final section, there are twelve related 
conclusions that derive i com the previous three sec­
tions, and form a unified analysis of the confrontation 
between media and government.
Conclusion 1: The role of media as a 4th branch 
of government is defacto in existence, for a functional 
media is necessary for democracy in a large country. 
"Many cf the characterisites that we associate with 
democracy depend on free access of all groups in a 
population to the channels of communication, both as 
senders and as receivers. These characteristics 
include nonviolent competition for political power 
among various groups within the nation. . . the abi­
lity of those outside the government to influence its 
actions, and the reliance of the government more on 
suasion and less on force to accomplish its domestic 
policies Ip.21 of International Communication!•" The 
various forms of media in a society do in fact function 
like a fourth branch of government, for communication 
is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the 
other three branches. Without amplification, these 
branches would be acting in a void, for large segments 
of the population would be ignorant of the various 
orders, laws, and decisions of the central authority.
Also, the media "checks" the other branches by 
investigating and reporting their actions to the
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general public. Most "public" information today is 
channeled through the medium of the media, which by its 
very design spotlights trouble in governmental affairs, 
e n d alerts the population to it.
Conclusion 2: Media influences the actions of the 
government both directly and indirectly. "From the 
founding of the country to the present day, the mass 
media have played an important role in nearly all the 
important events of the nation. Antislavery 
publications. . . did much to foment the Civil War, as 
did the newspaper editorials of Horace Greeley and 
James Gorden Bennett. William Randolph Hearstfs sen­
sational newspaper headlines helped to instigate the 
Spanish-American War. Crusading newspaper and magazine 
reporters and editors at the turn of the century - 
often called muckrakers - brought much - needed politi­
cal reform and social legislation to America |p.51 of 
Mass Media)." The press influences government directly 
due to the simple fact that officials are consumers of 
mass media. Moreover, a large bulk of the informa­
tional diet of the general public comes from the media, 
and it is the public that elects its representatives. 
This "two-step" influence is indirect in nature, and 
its importance should not be understated; although the 
extent of this influence is impossible to measure with 
any degree of accuracy.
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Conclusion 3: The government attempts to limit 
the scope of the media in order to promote secrecy on 
key matters. This principle was manifested in The 
Pentagon Papers case, which demonstrated the desire of 
the government to keep certain matters secret, for fear 
of damaging the security of the nation. The method by 
which this goal was pursued was the injunction, by 
which the government sought to prevent the media from 
printing potentially dangerous material. Other methods 
could have been employed - violence, pressuring justi­
ces, and closing down newspapers are seme such methods 
that have been used in other countries. However, the 
nature of our traditions, institutions, and constitu­
tion only allow for the use of much milder techniques, 
and prohibit such extreme conduct. Some of these 
milder techniques in< the art of rsuasion, 
recourse to the legal system, and controlling the level 
of governmental information that will be given to the 
press in the future. This last instance includes 
limiting who participates at official press conferen­
ces, limiting the actual number of conferences, and the 
refusal to answer certain questions on crucial issues.
Conclusion 4 s Tensions will unavoidably result 
from the conflict between media and government. These 
tensions may be reduced or enlarged, but they will 
remain due to the conflicting roles of the two
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institutions. Cases of severe reduction involve totali­
tarian regimes, where the media is actually a part of 
the government. Its role in this situation is to state 
the party line, and encourage the public in directions 
that are designed by the all-powerful state. "The 
Soviet-Communist theory of the press developed from 
application of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist philosophy to 
mass commmunication in the twentieth century. . . The 
media are a political arm of the state and are directed 
by high-ranking, orthodox party members. The press 
never criticizes a specific goal, although it may 
discuss means used to reach it. The media are owned by 
the state Ip.18 of Mass Med iaj."
Conclusion 5: The Pentagon Papers Case is a valid 
example of thr unavoidable nature of the confrontation 
between media and government. Its impact was large, 
its visibility was huge, and its ramifications are 
sizable. Not only did government and media clash, but 
they did so in a predictable fashion. In form and 
function it is a text-book case of media/government 
confrontation, and as has been shown here, an analysis 
of this case can help to better understand the nature 
of the conflict.
Conclusion 6t As the 20th century has progressed, 
the government has placed fewer and fewer restrictions 
on the media during periods of hostility with external
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forces. The pattern as already examined, runs from WWI 
all the way to the Vietnam War. The reasons for th’s 
pattern are two in number. First of all, the wars in 
the latter half of the century have been of a more 
limited scope, and have therefore engaged less of the 
attention of both government and populace. Since the 
population didn't need to be mobilized for these wars, 
the press was allowed greater freedom than if "total 
war" was the case. Secondly, new forms of communica­
tion have made it more difficult for the government to 
control the transmission of information, and the sheer 
speed at which these new modes can act, serves to dwarf 
the efforts of a slow moving institutionalized govern­
ment.
Conclusion 7: As the Pentagon Papers case shows, 
the confrontation with the press often divides up 
governmental branches into opposing camps, for the 
judicial decision in this case went against the will of 
the Executive of the nation. This division of branches 
is an integral part of the system of checks and balan­
ces set up by our constitution, and reflects only the 
proper functioning of the system, The press also 
checks these branches, by using its investigating 
powers to enlighten the public. Yet, rather than there 
being a unilateral flow of criticism from the media 
towards the branches of government, it is also
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necessary that each of the branches be able to express 
themselves publically - so that they may be able to 
check each other. "There are also grave dangers in not 
maintaining facilities that enable a government to pre­
sent its case and appeal for support. As with so many 
problems of democracy, the solution appears to lie in a 
proper balance. . . Ip. 25 of International Communi­
cation! .M
Conclusion 8$ History illuminates the long path 
of the evolution of media forms, which will no doubt 
continue to press on into the future, yet this evolu­
tion will not alter the fundamental conflict between 
media and government, for it is engrained in the struc­
ture of the relationship. The concept that new alien 
forms of communication will develop is undisputed, for 
this notion is firmly rooted in the past. "One of the 
most constant factors about our electronic mass media 
is thsir continuous change. The television set of 
today is a vastly different object from what people 
were viewing in the late lS40's. Television may not be 
the final of the mass media. Devices for printing 
newspapers or even magazines in the home are under 
study. Special tapes to play over a home television 
set are already available. . • media that are beyond 
our imagination may become as commonplace in the future 
as a radio receiver or a television set is today Ip*73
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of Theories of Mass Communication]." Regardless of new 
inventions, the conflict will rage on unhindered bet­
ween the press and the government. This will continue 
unless their roles are altered, as has happened in many 
communist countries, where the media has become an arm 
of the government.
Tensions may be reduced in yet another way, for 
propaganda leads to a merger of purposes, by having the 
media report a distorted nationalistic line while using 
the guise of honest reporting. Often the media may not 
realize that they are being misled by official sources, 
thus constituting unknowing falsification of facts and 
figures. Unfortunately, new methods of communication, 
like radio and television, lend themselves frequently 
towards these pursuits - knowlingly or unknowingly. 
Propaganda often is expressed over several modes of 
communication like "direct mail, op-ed pieces, talk 
shows, seminars for policymakers, films, and all the 
other paraphernalia of fear. . . in a world dominated 
by nuclear weapons, fear is a reality, and those who 
exploit it with vivid imagery often have an initial 
advantage over those who try to talk calmly and 
rationally (p.4 of Peddlers of Crisis]."
Conclusion 9t History shows that one of the best 
protectors of the media is an informed, active, and 
independent legal system. When any of the three above
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characteristics are absent, the results can be 
catastrophic - for it takes little time for any gover­
nment to attach some strings to the media in an effort 
to turn it into a puppet institution. Often democra­
cies cross over into forms of repressive government. 
Apathy, which is common in democracies, is especially 
dangerous if it absorbs the judicial system within its 
paralyzing grasp. All precautions must be taken to 
preserve an alert and independent legal system, so that 
it, and not the government, may draw the line between 
media and government - in order to promote an effective 
balance. "The First Amendment to the Constitution is 
imprecise, however, and does not define limits of 
freedom. Court and legislative decisions since that 
time have continued to establish the meaning of that 
amendment, usually in the light of current trends and 
social conditions. The Constitution as it is 
intercreated by the courts and lawmakers controls the 
regulators and determines which of their actions are 
permissible and constitutional under the American 
system fp.132 of Mass Media)."
Conclusion 10: The need to educate and instill 
values in future legalists that will support legal and 
media freedoms is fundamental to the survival of these 
freedoms. These values should be promoted by the 
media, and taught by educators at all levels of the 
educational system.
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Conclusion 11: Currently, the conflict between 
the media and government is a balanced and healthy one, 
for both parties reap sizable rewards from their asso­
ciation with one another. The media gets watched, 
read, and listened to in part because of their 
reporting of governmental affairs. In turn, they sell 
commercial t. ite or advertising space to customers, thus 
adding the profit motive to their dealings with the 
government. The government is able to explain and pro­
mote its policies via the media, which can he crucial 
in gaining the support of the population for a par­
ticular policy. Furthermore, it can pass on values 
that are needed for the proper functioning of a 
democracy. Apathy, which can threaten the existence of 
a free media, also threatens the existence of democra­
tic forms of government. The media provides the 
government with the means to mobilize the general popu­
lation against internal and external threats. Since 
both institutions have much to gain from an association 
that is balanced, it is of great necessity to maintain 
equalibrium.
Conclusion 12: In order to maintain equalibrium 
in the future, both the media and the government must 
avoid all extreme forms of confrontational conduct. 
For its part, the madia must control its members, ^nd 
force them to act in a constructive and ethical manner.
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Thu Code of Ethics of Journalism (Article 1) declares 
that the "right of a newspaper to attract and hold 
readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of 
public welfare. The use a newspaper makes of the 
share of public attention it gains serves to determine 
its sense of responsibility, which it shares with every 
member of its staff. A journalist who uses his power 
for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faith­
less to a high trust (p.141 of Mass Media).” The above 
Code of Ethics demonstrates that journalists do 
recognize the high level of responsibility that goes 
hand-in-hand with a free press, hopefully such recogni­
tion will prevent future abuses. Looking back, one 
comes upon the infamous period of "yellow journalism” 
that constituted the second part of the 19th century, 
an era that revolved around irresponsible reporting 
that was full of distortions and half-truths. "As the 
competition intensified into open conflict, the papers 
turned more and more to any sensationalistic device 
that would attract additional readers, no matter how 
shallow and blatant. In the early 1890's yellow jour­
nalism burst full blown upon the American public. . . 
|p. 17 of Theories of Mass Communication)." With good 
fortune and hard work the abuses of the past will 
remain behind us, and these excessive levels will 
remain confined to history books.
The government for its part, should also act with
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The Code of Ethics of Journalism (Article 1) declares 
that the "right of a newspaper to attract and hold 
readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of 
public welfare. The use a newspaper makes of the 
share of public attention it gains serves to determine 
its sense of responsibility, which it shares with every 
member of its staff. A journalist who uses his power 
for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faith­
less to a high trust |p.l41 of Mass Media]." The above 
Code of Ethics demonstrates that journalists do 
recognize the high level of responsibility that goes 
hand-in-hand with a free press, hopefully such recogni­
tion will prevent future abuses. Looking back, one 
comes upon the infamous period of "yellow journalism" 
that constituted the second part of the 19th century, 
an era that revolved around irresponsible reporting 
that was full of distortions and half-truths. "As the 
competition intensified into open conflict, the papers 
turned more and more to any sensationalistic device 
that would attract additional readers, no matter how 
shallow and blatant. In the early 1890's yellow jour­
nalism burst full blown upon the American public. . . 
tp.17 of Theories of Mass Communication]." With good 
fortune and hard work the abuses of the past will 
remain behind us, and these excessive levels will 
remain confined to history books.
The government for its part, should slso act with
tolerance, and it should extend every means at its 
disposal to keep its conflict with the media at a happy 
level of egualibrium.
In short, the tensions between media and govern­
ment have existed, do exist, and will exist in the 
future. Tolerance must guide both parties, and when 
the wise path of tolerance is not followed, an indepen­
dent judiciary should step in and restore the proper 
balance - as happened in The Pentagon Papers case. 
What constitutes "balance” cannot be stated in a pre­
cise doctrinaire way, but rather it must be decided 
with careful consideration being given to the exact 
situation at-hand, and with the justices keeping one 
eye on the past - while the other preadventures the 
complexities of the future.
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